Interview : Robert Moffitt by Aaron Steelman
RF: I want to start off by asking a few questions about
welfare reform. How have single mothers who have left
welfare fared in the workplace, both in terms of
employment rates and the wages they have been able to
command?  
Moffitt: The employment rates of single mothers who left
welfare after the 1996 legislation have been in the range of
60 to 80 percent. Those rates have generally been viewed as
remarkably high. While on welfare, these women had not
worked more than 20 to 25 percent of the time and were
regarded as essentially unemployable. As for their wage
rates, they have been in the $8 to $10 per hour range, well
above the minimum. The jobs held by these former welfare
recipients are not necessarily the best jobs in the world —
they are still quite unskilled, often unpleasant, and some-
times unstable — but they pay decent wages. The combined
result of their increase in employment and increase in 
wage rates has been an increase in their earnings as well. But
their total incomes have not risen much, on average,
because their lost welfare benefits have been close to 
their increased earnings. But one of the goals of the welfare





























Editor’s Note: This is an abbreviated version of RF’s 
conversation with Robert Moffitt. For the full interview, 
go to our Web site: www.richmondfed.org
When the 1996 welfare reform act was passed,
pundits expressed heated opinions about how 
the legislation would affect the nation’s poor. 
Some claimed it would finally end the “culture 
of dependency” and help people move up the 
economic ladder. Others said that it would send
single mothers and their children into destitution.
Now almost a decade after the legislation was
enacted, Robert Moffitt, a labor economist at
Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, has looked
carefully at the data. He has found that the facts
are somewhat more complicated than the 
punditocracy predicted. In general, former 
welfare recipients have been successful in joining
the labor force. But there remains a segment 
of the population for whom regular work has 
proved elusive.
Moffitt’s research also has addressed such issues as
income inequality, the effects of marginal tax rates
on labor supply, and the economics of marriage. 
In addition, he has made a number of important
methodological contributions, and is a Fellow of the
Econometric Society. Since July 2004, he has served
as chief editor of the American Economic Review. 
Prior to joining the Johns Hopkins faculty, Moffitt
taught at Brown University and Rutgers University.
He also held visiting positions at the University of
Wisconsin and the University of Maryland, and
worked at Mathematica Policy Research, Inc.
Aaron Steelman interviewed Moffitt at 
Johns Hopkins on July 27, 2005.
RF Fall2005 v10 revisedpg46.ps - 10/14/2005 4:28 PMreform legislation was to get welfare recipients into employ-
ment and out of dependence on federal support, and from
that standpoint it appears to have worked.
RF: The welfare reform act was implemented during a
period when labor markets were unusually strong. Were
the women who moved from welfare to work dispropor-
tionately affected by the recession of 2001?  
Moffitt: The results on the recession are pretty surpris-
ing. The employment rates of single mothers and former 
welfare mothers fell only slightly during the 2001 reces-
sion. So instead of 70 percent, they were about 68 percent
— still far higher than they had been in 1996 when the leg-
islation was enacted. I’m less familiar with the data on
wage rates, but I would suspect
that they didn’t fall much either.
Consequently, the recession does
not appear to have driven many
former welfare recipients back
into unemployment or back onto
welfare. 
This finding really reinforces the
first one. The first major concern
about welfare reform was the fear that a substantial share of
women on welfare would not be able to handle the reform
and would be unable to find jobs and would possibly become
homeless, resulting in widespread destitution. That did not
happen and, in fact, the majority of women successfully
negotiated the reform. The second concern was that this
success was only a result of the good economy, and that the
women who had left welfare would be in trouble once the
economy slowed. That appears not to have happened either. 
So, in retrospect, it appears that many of these women did
have sufficient skills to work and that welfare reform gave
them the push to enter the labor market and establish them-
selves. Again, however, it is always necessary to caution
against too rosy a picture. The jobs held by former welfare
recipients are not particularly good jobs, and most of the evi-
dence shows that those jobs do not lead to much wage
growth or advancement. Moreover, many former recipients
have serious problems of other kinds. But, on average, wel-
fare reform has been a success story. I don’t think even most
of the legislation’s original critics would object to the gist of
this conclusion. Virtually everyone agrees that we should
stick with the basic approach of the legislation, though many
would argue that we should fine-tune it to better protect the
most vulnerable people in the system and perhaps to go back
and do a bit of patching up of the holes in the safety net.     
RF: For several decades — in fact, almost since the
inception of Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) — there were calls for reforming the welfare
system. Yet we didn’t see major legislation until the mid-
1990s. What were the constellation of events that made
such legislation possible? 
Moffitt:  The public’s attitude toward welfare and many
other transfer programs has become more conservative over
time. The 1960s were probably the high watermark of 
government activism and strengthening of  the social safety
net, and since then confidence in government’s ability to
deal with social problems has generally diminished.
Congress attempted a series of welfare reforms in the 1970s
and the 1980s that either didn’t pass or that weren’t particu-
larly strong. But all those reforms were in the same
direction: an increased emphasis on work and stronger work
requirements. In addition, during the period when Congress
was unable to craft a major overhaul of welfare, it allowed
the states to experiment on their own. The states started
reforming their welfare systems in a more conservative
direction, before there was final federal action. So even
though the 1996 legislation was a
landmark, I think we need to see it
as the culmination of a series of
smaller steps which eventually led
us to a tipping point.
As for the source of the
increased conservatism on the 
part of voters, I think that the
increased labor force participation
of middle-class women was part of the cause. That transfor-
mation really changed the attitude of voters. Once a large
percentage of middle-class women were working and put-
ting their children into day care, the public began to
question why we shouldn’t expect the same thing from poor
women. There was no longer the support for paying women
to stay at home with their children, which was the goal of
the original legislation in 1935. 
Another turn against welfare, I think, has to do with the
changing composition of the welfare caseload. In the 1960s,
the caseload was largely composed of divorced women. One
could imagine that members of the middle class, while not
looking favorably upon divorce, understood it because many
of them were getting divorced too. But by the 1980s, the
caseload started to become composed largely of young
women who had never been married and were having chil-
dren out of wedlock. That is a completely different group,
and the middle class had a great deal less sympathy toward
those women.
A final factor is that I think the attitudes among women
receiving welfare changed. If you look at attitudinal studies
from the early 1990s, many welfare recipients said that they
didn’t like welfare, that they thought other women were
gaming the system to stay on welfare, and were not really
trying to improve their lives. Welfare recipients had incor-
porated the social norms of the middle class. And once the
legislation led some recipients to move off welfare, it had a
snowball effect. They began to exert social pressure on other
women to find work. I think that increased stigma within
poor populations made it easier to overhaul the welfare 
system. But it took a major shock; incremental reform would
not have done it. 
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On average, 
welfare reform has been 
a success story.
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your estimation, who have very significant employment
problems? 
Moffitt:  I mentioned earlier that about 70 percent of 
former welfare recipients are working at any time. One
could take this to mean that the other 30 percent are the
ones with significant employment problems. But that would
be an overestimate, because some of those women aren’t
working at the time and yet have some job skills which make
it possible for them to find work in the private sector.
Instead, there is a smaller group composed of women who
have one or more serious problems such as cognitive limita-
tions or poor education which make it difficult for
employers to want to hire them, or serious health issues, or
substance abuse, or domestic violence. 
Many women have multiple problems of this sort, and it
is difficult for them to get help if
they are off welfare — an irony is
that if you are on welfare, you get
identified, you have a caseworker,
and you are directed to relevant pro-
grams. But once you are off welfare
you have to find that help yourself,
and many women simply don’t have
the wherewithal to do that effec-
tively. There have been studies
trying to count the number of
women with each of the problems I
listed, how many have multiple
problems, and so on. My estimate
would be that the share of women
who are in this category is no less
than 5 percent and no more than 15
percent. Some might think that the
percent is slightly higher. 
I think that most observers agree
that the next step in welfare reform
is to address the problems facing this
segment of the population. That is
going to be very difficult, especially given the fiscal situation
the states have faced recently. Many of the social programs
that were designed to help these women were conducted at
the state level, and when state budgets got tight, those pro-
grams were often among the first programs to have their
funding reduced. Perhaps their funding will be restored now
that revenues are growing again at the state level.
RF: You have done some work on the growth in wage
inequality. Please tell us a little bit about your findings.
Moffitt: My work, mostly with Peter Gottschalk at Boston
College, began by addressing the perception of all analysts
that the increase in wage inequality arose entirely from a
change in what we may call permanent earnings, driven by
such factors as increased demand for high-skilled labor. But
when Gottschalk and I used the panel data and calculated
changes in individual earnings over time in the 1970s and
1980s, we found that 50 percent of the increase in the cross-
sectional variance was due instead to increases in the
transitory component of earnings. In other words, earnings
have become more volatile over time and this has been a major
contribution to the cross-sectional increase in inequality, yet it
has a very different interpretation than the usual one.
Increases in the transitory component have occurred at
all levels of the skill distribution but your view of increas-
es in volatility might be different depending on whether
you are examining the top or the bottom. If you examine
the very top, much of the increased volatility comes from
skilled workers who earn big bonuses in one year but don’t
the next. These workers are doing well and their average
earnings are rising, but they are in occupations where their
earnings can fluctuate widely from year to year. This
strikes me as something that
shouldn’t worry us a great deal and,
in fact, could be argued to be a sign
of a more productive and more
competitive labor market. But at
the middle and the bottom of the
distribution, I think there is more
of a concern. Earnings on low-wage
jobs have become more unstable at
the same time that average earnings
on those jobs have been declining,
making it seem as though the jobs
themselves are getting worse in
multiple dimensions.
I don’t have a conclusive answer
for the cause of this change in the
labor market, but I wonder if there
has not been an increase in the 
general volatility of many industries
in the United States today. Comp-
etition is stiffer today in many
industries than it used to be, with
firms rising and falling faster than
they used to, which can produce large peaks and valleys in
the earnings of those who work for those companies. 
RF: In the early 1960s, Milton Friedman pushed for the
implementation of a negative income tax. That program
was never implemented in the form that Friedman
advocated, though certain elements have shown up in
policies that subsequently have been enacted. How do
you think the negative income tax has influenced the
policy debate regarding aid to low-income people?
Moffitt:  The negative income tax is a topic that has 
fascinated economists for a long time. The basic idea of a
reduction in the implicit tax rate on working for welfare
recipients appeals to basic economic principles. When I left
graduate school in the 1970s, for example, it was the hope
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something similar to a negative income tax. It has been
extremely popular among academics and scholars, but it 
has turned out to be less popular among policymakers.
There was a reform of the AFDC system in the late
1960s which lowered the marginal tax rate on earnings for
women in the AFDC program. But the reduction was pret-
ty small, so the effects on labor force participation were
limited. It wasn’t really until the welfare reform of 1996
that major reductions in the marginal tax rate have
occurred; for most of these last few decades, the rate has
been at or very close to 100 percent.
The negative income tax had a number of other features
which have likewise fared pretty poorly in the public
domain. Perhaps the most notable was that the negative
income tax was supposed to replace all other transfer 
programs — that there should be one simple program that
covered all needs. That was an essential part of the idea
according to Friedman, but it is an idea that has been 
decisively rejected by Congress and the voters. 
We still have numerous special programs for food, 
medical care, housing, child care, and the like. Indeed, the
pure general-purpose cash programs have become very
small relative to everything else. From an economist’s
standpoint, this is problematic. We generally believe that
the most efficient way to help people is to give them a
direct cash transfer, because they know better than us
what their needs are and how they should allocate their
resources. But the public, I think, believes that the poor
have demonstrated that they do not make good choices on
their own, and that we should give them the services we
believe they need rather than allowing them to purchase
them on their own. The voters, I believe, are basically
paternalistic toward the poor and this has shaped the poli-
cies we have adopted.
There are only two cash programs of any significance
today, and they both reinforce this conclusion. One is the
Supplemental Security Income program, which goes to
aged, blind, and disabled people with low incomes. Those
individuals are not viewed as having bad preferences or bad
habits. Instead, they are in their situation through no fault of
their own, and the public believes we ought to treat them as
such. The second program is the Earned Income Tax Credit.
This program is targeted at earners; by definition, you have
to be working in order to qualify for the program. So with
both of these programs, the recipients are seen as having
good preferences, and that they can be trusted to wisely
spend money that is transferred to them. 
RF: Have you looked at the effect recent reductions in
marginal income tax rates have had on the labor 
supply of high-income male workers? If not, can 
your work on the effects of the 1986 tax reform act
shed light on the responsiveness of such workers to
alter their labor decisions when faced with lower 
marginal rates?
Moffitt: I haven’t done work on the recent reductions in
marginal income tax rates, but I do have some thoughts on
the topic given my previous research. It is an interesting
topic because there has been a sharp change in the way 
economists view the evidence. In the 1960s and 1970s, most
economists did not think that lower marginal rates would
have much of an effect on the labor supply of high-
income workers. The first person who really challenged 
that view was Jerry Hausman, who found that there were
some nontrivial effects at the top that led to significant
deadweight losses. But when other analysts looked at his
data more closely, it wasn’t clear that the evidence support-
ed such a conclusion because sample sizes at the top were
very small. 
Then Marty Feldstein began examining this question by
using tax data with much larger samples of high-income
workers, and he, too, argued that there were significant
effects on the labor supply of high-income males — as 
marginal tax rates went down, the amount of taxable 
income reported increased. Another new point made by
Feldstein was that much of the responsiveness was in
increased wage rates that came from increased incentives 
to find better employment opportunities and even 
entrepreneurial activities; the response was not entirely in
hours of work.
In my work on the issue, conducted with Mark Wilhelm,
we went back and looked at hours of work following the
1986 tax cuts, focusing again on the very top of the income
distribution. We found no effect. The reason turned out to
be fairly straightforward: The workers at the very top were
already working extremely long hours (3,000 to 4,000 hours
per year) and really couldn’t work much more. There simply
wasn’t room for them to respond to lower marginal tax rates
in the way that others had argued or that theory might 
predict. So how can we square our findings with Feldstein’s
findings? One is simply that the response was in earnings,
not hours of work, as Feldstein pointed out. But I think 
that there is another factor at work as well, which relates 
to the way that workers at the very top structure their 
compensation packages. 
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attention to the tax treatment of their income. When tax
rates were high, they received more of their compensation in
nontaxable forms. But when tax rates fell, there was less 
reason to do this, so more of their compensation began to
move into taxable forms. This process can make it appear
that lower marginal rates increase earnings when in fact it
was just a change from nontaxable to taxable form.
As I said, I haven’t looked at the data from the most
recent rounds of tax cuts. But I would be surprised if the 
evidence was much different from what we found in the
1980s. I would doubt that the biggest earners in the 
economy have increased their labor output much as a result
of lower marginal tax rates.
How about elsewhere in the income distribution? Here,
too, I think the evidence is fairly mixed. For males, it is not
clear that lower marginal tax rates induce them to work
more. Many males in the labor force are already working 35
to 40 hours a week and they do not have much opportunity
to increase that number. Their employers simply do not
offer them overtime or flexible hours. In order to increase
their labor supply, they would have to find a second job. But
for females who are not in the labor force, lower marginal
rates can have a significant effect on their decision to work.
When rates are high, they may decide that work is not worth
it — that there are important things to do at home which 
are more valuable than working. But when rates are lowered,
their calculation changes. They are now able to keep a larger
share of their earnings and may decide that entering the
labor force is worthwhile. 
I should also add that the self-employed face different
incentives too. Unlike adult males working for someone else,
the self-employed generally have an opportunity to alter
their work patterns — that is, to increase their labor supply
in response to lower marginal tax rates. So I wouldn’t be sur-
prised if this were to show up in the data.    
RF: How does increased compensation affect soldiers’
decisions to re-enlist?
Moffitt:  I have tried to build some simple models which
assume that soldiers are forward-looking agents. Much of this
work was co-authored with Tom Daula. I have found that the
bonuses the military has offered to get soldiers to re-enlist do
not have a large effect. They simply are not big enough to
change most soldiers’ decisions. What is more important is
the type of training that a soldier can expect to get in the mil-
itary. Let’s say that you join when you are 18 and that you make
a career of it, meaning you spend 20 years with the military.
That means you get out when you are 38. Sure, you get a nice
military retirement package when you leave. But at 38, you are
still a relatively young man and you will want to have acquired
skills that will allow you to have a career on the outside at a
good job. Those type of issues tend to dominate compensa-
tion issues, especially when the compensation takes the form
of a one-time bonus payment for re-enlistment.  
RF: What do you see as the major challenges facing the
American Economic Review and academic publishing 
in economics more generally? 
Moffitt: I took over as chief editor of the AER in July
2004 and have therefore been in the job now a little over
a year. There are both specific and general issues with the
AER and with economic journals in general. By far the
most important specific issue is turnaround time for papers,
the time it takes from when a paper is sent to a referee to
when I finally get enough reports to make a decision. At
the  AER, this time is often quite long, six months or
more, and that has become a serious problem. It is worse
at some other journals but better at some others, but it is
a systematic problem at all economic journals. I do not
quite understand why this is the case, because you don’t
see it in the other social sciences. There have been a num-
ber of explanations offered — Glenn Ellison has done the
best work on this — but none of which I find completely
convincing. But one thing is certain: When I talk to those
economists interested in submitting papers at the AER
and elsewhere, this is their biggest complaint. Working on
this problem at the AER is one of my highest priorities. 
Another less specific problem one hears from authors is
that the quality of the referee reports is low, sometimes
occurring when reports express very divergent opinions.
Many authors feel as though a paper has not received a fair
reading by at least one of the referees. While there are lim-
its to how this perception can be changed, because it is
only human nature to feel that way when your work is
rejected, the one thing I have done at the AER to address
this problem is to increase the number of co-editors on the
journal. This introduces more expertise among the editors
and allows a better choice of referees and better judge-
ments after the reports come in.
Finally, my major goal for the AER is to see it build
upon its niche. The number of journals in economics has
been growing sharply, but there are still really only three
leading general-interest journals: the AER, the Quarterly
Journal of Economics, and the Journal of Political Economy. 
I think that the QJE and the JPE have become increasingly
associated with specific schools of thought. Both of those
journals are affiliated with university economics depart-
ments — the QJEwith Harvard and the JPEwith Chicago —
and I think many of the papers that appear in those journals
reflect the perspectives dominant in those departments. 
In contrast, the AER is the official journal of the
American Economic Association and, as such, it should 
be expected to represent the profession as a whole. 
I would like to see the AER open to a wide variety of 
perspectives, methodological and substantive, and to 
publish the best work that is conducted in all of those 
perspectives. I think that the AER has been fairly 
successful in that regard in the past, but there are areas 
for improvement, and it is a very important objective 
that deserves constant attention. RF
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